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Abstract 
The paper examines the relationship between the innovator’s patenting and patent breadth decisions 
as well as how these two decisions affect, and are affected by, the innovator’s ability to enforce her 
patent rights. An important feature of the model is that the entrant may be able, by his choice of 
location in product space, to affect the innovator’s decision to defend her patent. An interesting 
finding of the paper is that the innovator might find it optimal to patent her innovation even when 
she chooses to not defend her patent by invoking a trial when patent infringement occurs. The paper 
also shows that, in most cases, the greater is the entrant’s R&D effectiveness, the smaller is the 
innovator’s incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the greater is R&D 
effectiveness, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering infringement. 
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Patents have been used over the last 500 years as means of protecting intellectual property. The 
decision to patent an innovation implies that patenting is perceived as generating more rents than 
when no protection is in place. Under no patent protection the innovator cannot generally influence 
the market entry and location decisions of potential entrants; at best, the innovator may be able to 
hinder the generation of competing innovations by keeping her innovation a secret. Under patent 
protection, however, potential entrants are required to locate a certain distance away from the 
patentee’s innovation to not infringe the patent. This distance is specified by the breadth of the 
patent, which is determined, to a large extent, by the patentee through the claims that she makes in 
the patent application. Thus, once the decision to patent has been made, the innovator needs to make 
another important decision, namely, how broad of a protection to claim.  
The innovator’s patent breadth choice is a strategic decision that has important implications 
both for the level of competition that she will face in the market and for her ability to 
enforce/defend her patent right. The greater is the breadth of patent protection, the harder it is for 
potential competitors to enter into the patentee’s market with non-infringing innovations and thus 
the longer the patentee can maintain the limited monopoly that the patent grants. However, the   3
broader is a patent, the greater is the likelihood of both infringement and patent validity challenges 
by competitors and/or third parties, which if successful will reduce the effective patent life and 
consequently the innovator’s ability to capture innovation rents (Merges and Nelson 1990, Lerner 
1994, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). This possibility is especially critical in light of the increase 
in patent litigation during the last decades, particularly in the field of biotechnology, and the 
increase in the number of patents that are invalidated after being challenged (Barton 2000, Choi 
1998). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that courts tend to uphold narrow patents and 
revoke or limit the scope of broad ones (Waterson 1990). The possibility that broad patent 
protection may impede a firm’s ability to safeguard and defend its technological territory raises the 
question as to what constitutes an optimal patenting behavior for the innovator.  
The analysis of the innovator’s patenting behavior in the existing patent literature has 
focused on either the decision to patent the innovation or to keep it a secret (Waterson 1990, 
Horstmann et al. 1985), or on the optimal patent breadth decision by the patentee under the case 
where invoking an infringement trial when the patent has been infringed is always optimal 
(Yiannaka and Fulton 2003). While the above decisions have been studied in isolation, they are 
related; in addition other possibilities exist, such as the case where the patentee finds that it is not 
desirable to defend her patent by invoking a trial when infringement occurs.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the innovator’s patenting 
and patent breadth decisions as well as how these two decisions affect, and are affected by, the 
innovator’s ability to enforce her patent rights. On this last point, the paper also examines whether it 
is possible for the innovator to affect the entrant’s location decision (and thus the rents that can be 
captured by the patent) even when defending the patent under infringement is not optimal. To 
address the above issues, the paper develops a game theoretic model that examines the optimal 
patenting behavior of an incumbent innovator who has generated a patentable product innovation   4
and who is faced with potential entry by another firm. The incumbent/innovator has to decide 
whether she should patent her innovation, and if so, what patent breadth should be claimed. If her 
patent is infringed, the incumbent also has to decide whether she should invoke a trial to defend the 
patent. An important feature of the model is that the entrant may be able, by his choice of location 
in product space, to affect the incumbent’s decision to defend her patent.    
An interesting finding of the paper is that the innovator might find it optimal to patent her 
innovation even when she chooses not to defend her patent by invoking a trial when patent 
infringement occurs. In other words, patenting may be a profitable strategy even if the patent will 
not subsequently be defended. This result occurs because, by choosing to patent her innovation, the 
incumbent can induce the entrant to choose a location in the product space that, even though it 
infringes the patent, is still advantageous for the incumbent (i.e., it is further away from the 
incumbent’s location than the location chosen under no patent protection). Under this case, the 
entrant, knowing that his location decision affects the incumbent’s decision to invoke a trial, 
strategically chooses a location that will not be challenged by the incumbent. This result is more 
likely to occur when reverse engineering is costless to the potential entrant and the entrant’s R&D 
effectiveness is low – his R&D costs are high. The paper also shows that, in most cases, the greater 
is the entrant’s R&D effectiveness, the smaller is the innovator’s incentive to patent her product. If 
patenting occurs, however, the greater is R&D effectiveness, the greater is the patent breadth that 
could be chosen without triggering infringement. This result occurs because the greater is the 
entrant’s R&D effectiveness, the further away from the incumbent the entrant can locate in the 
product space. The outcome is increased product differentiation, less competition and thus higher 
profits for both players. Other factors affecting the innovator’s optimal patenting behavior are the 
probability that the patent will be found valid at trial and the monopoly profits earned when market 
entry can be deterred.     5
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the theoretical 
development of the strategic patent breadth model; it describes the market conditions, defines patent 
breadth and models the choice of patent breadth as a sequential game of complete information. 
Section three provides the analytical solution of the model. Finally, section four concludes the 
paper. 
2.  The Patent Breadth Model 
2.1 Model  Assumptions 
The model builds upon the model developed by Yiannaka and Fulton (2003) to study the optimal 
patent breadth decision when under infringement a trial always takes place. In our model the 
optimal patent breadth strategy is determined in a sequential game of complete information. The 
agents in the game are an incumbent innovator who has invented a patentable drastic product 
innovation and decides whether to seek patent protection, how broad of a protection to claim and 
whether to defend her patent when infringement occurs and a potential entrant who decides on 
whether to enter the incumbent’s market and, if entry occurs, where to locate in a vertically 
differentiated product space. Both the incumbent and the entrant are risk neutral and maximize 
profits. It is assumed that the regulator (e.g., Patent Office) always grants the patent as claimed; 
thus, the regulator is not explicitly modeled.  
  The incumbent’s investment decision that led to the development of a new product is not 
examined – this decision is treated as exogenous to the game. In addition, it is assumed that the 
incumbent and the entrant each produce at most one product and that the entrant does not patent his 
product since further entry is not anticipated. The production process for the entrant is assumed to 
be deterministic, so that once the entrant chooses a location she can produce the chosen product 
with certainty. It is also assumed that there is no time lag between making and realizing a decision.   6
  The incumbent and the entrant, if he enters, operate in a vertically differentiated product 
market. To keep the analysis tractable, it is assumed that no substitute exists for the products 
produced by the incumbent and the entrant. Consumers differ according to some attribute λ ,  
uniformly distributed with unit density  1 ) ( = λ f  in the interval  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ λ , each buying one unit of 
either the incumbent’s or the entrant’s product but not both. The incumbent is assumed to have 
developed a product that provides consumers with utility  p p p p q V U − + = λ , where V is a base 
level of utility,  p q  is the quality of the incumbent’s product  p p  is the price of the product produced 
by the incumbent. The entrant’s product has quality  p e q q > , ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ e q , that provides consumers 
with utility  e e e p q V U − + = λ , where  e p  is the price of the entrant’s product. Without affecting the 
qualitative nature of the model, the quality of the incumbent’s product  p q  is set equal to zero (i.e., 
0 = p q ). As a result, the entrant’s quality  e q  is interpreted as the difference in quality between his 
product and that of the incumbent, or more generally as the distance the entrant has located away 
from the incumbent.
1 
 Product  i ( e p i , = ) is consumed as long as  0 ≥ i U  and  j i U U > . It is assumed that V is 
large enough so that  e p i p V i , = ∀ ≥  and the market is always served by at least one product. The 
consumer who is indifferent between the two products has a λ denoted by 
* λ , where 
* λ  is 









* λ  
                                                 
1 With       qp ≠ 0 , equation (1) becomes 





. Since the quality difference,    qe −q p, in the denominator is the 
relevant parameter of interest in the subsequent analysis, the assumption that      qp =0 can be made to ease the notation 
without affecting the qualitative nature of the model.   7
Since each consumer consumes one unit of the product of her choice, the demand for the products 
produced by the incumbent and the entrant are given by 
* λ = p y  and 
* 1 λ − = e y , respectively. 
  The incumbent’s decision to patent the innovation implies patenting costs denoted by z, z>0, 
that are assumed to be independent of patent breadth. This assumption is in line with our 
assumption that the Patent Office always grants the patent as claimed (for a discussion on the Patent 
Office’s role in the patent granting process for drastic innovations see Yiannaka and Fulton (2003)).    
The incumbent has already incurred the development costs associated with the product 
quality that she wants to patent. Thus, the R&D costs for the incumbent are sunk. For the entrant, 
however, market entry can only occur if he develops a higher quality product. To do so, he incurs 






F β =  and 
9
4
≥ β . The restriction on the parameter β  ensures that 
the quality chosen by the entrant,  e q , is bounded between zero and one. Note that with this 
formulation, 0 ) ( > ′ e e q F  and  0 ) ( > ′ ′ e e q F , thus, it is increasingly costly for the entrant to locate away 
from the incumbent in the one-dimensional product space (i.e., to produce the better quality 
product). In addition, since  e q  represents the quality difference between the incumbent’s and the 
entrant’s product the filing of a patent by the incumbent provides the entrant with knowledge of 
how to produce the incumbent’s product (i.e.,  0 ) ( = p e q F  – the assumption of perfect information 
disclosure by the patent is made). An important assumption of the model is that in the absence of 
the patent reserves engineering of the product innovation is possible and costless. The R&D costs 
are assumed sunk once they have been incurred and neither the incumbent nor the entrant find it 
optimal to relocate once they have chosen their respective qualities. Once the R&D costs are 
incurred, production of the products by both the incumbent and the entrant occur at zero marginal 
cost.    8
  The patent breadth claimed and granted to the incumbent’s product is denoted by b  and it 
defines the area in the one-dimensional product space that the patent protects, thus,  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b . Patent 
breadth values close to zero indicate protection of the patented innovation only against duplication. 
When the entrant locates at a distance  b qe <  away from  p q  the patent is infringed and the 
incumbent must decide whether to invoke an infringement trial or not. It is assumed that the filing 
of an infringement lawsuit by the incumbent is always met with a counterclaim by the accused 
infringer that the patent is invalid.
2 The costs incurred during the infringement trial/validity attack 
by the incumbent and the entrant are denoted by 
T
p C  and 
T
e C , respectively. These costs are assumed 
to be independent of the breadth of protection and of the entrant’s location. The trial costs will only 
be incurred if  b qe <  and they are assumed to be sunk − once made they cannot be recovered by 
either party.
3  
  The patent system being modeled is assumed to be that of the fencepost type, in which 
patent claims define an exact border of protection. Under the fencepost system, infringement will 
always be found when an entrant locates within the incumbent’s claims, unless the entrant proves 
that the patent is invalid (Cornish 1989).
4 In the fencepost system the probability that infringement 
is found does not depend on how close the entrant has located to the incumbent. The implication of 
assuming a fencepost patent system is that the probability that infringement will be found (given 
that the entrant has located at  b qe <  distance away from  p q ) is equal to the probability that the 
validity of the patent will be upheld. Thus, the fencepost patent system implies that the events that 
                                                 
2 This is a standard defence adopted by accused infringers (Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990).  
3 With this assumption we exclude the possibility of the court awarding lawyers’ fees to either party.  
4 In contrast, a signpost patent system implies that claims provide an indication of protection and the claims are 
interpreted using the doctrines of equivalents and reverse equivalents. Under a signpost system the closer the entrant 
locates to the incumbent the easier it is to prove infringement using the doctrine of equivalents. In addition, 
infringement may be found even when the entrant locates outside the incumbent’s claims using the doctrine of reverse 
equivalents.    9
the patent is found to be infringed and that the patent is found to be invalid can be treated as 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
5  
  Patent validity is directly linked to patent breadth. In general, the broader is the patent 
protection, the harder it is to show novelty, nonobviousness and enablement (Miller and Davis 
1990). Thus, the broader is patent protection, the harder it is to establish validity. In addition, 
evidence from the literature shows that courts tend to uphold narrow patents and invalidate broad 
ones (Waterson 1990, Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990). To capture these observations, the 
probability  (b) µ  that the patent will be found to be valid, or equivalently that infringement will be 
found, is assumed to be inversely related to patent breadth – i.e.,  (b) 0 µ′ < . Specifically, 
(b) 1 b µ α =− .
6 Thus, 1( b )b µ α −=  is the probability that the patent will be found to be invalid. 
The validity parameter α ,  (0,1) α ∈ , reflects the degree that patent breadth affects patent validity. 
For any given patent breadth, the greater is the validity parameter α, the greater is the probability 
that the patent will be found invalid. 
2.2 The  Game 
The patent breadth game consists of five stages. In the first stage of the game, the incumbent 
decides whether to seek patent protection or not. If the incumbent decides not to patent her 
innovation then, given the assumption of possible and costless reverse engineering, the entrant 
enters at his most preferred location and he and the incumbent compete in prices at the last stage of 
the game and earn duopoly profits 
NP
e Π  and 
NP
p Π , respectively. If the incumbent decides to patent 
                                                 
5 Note that, our analysis and results are not affected by whether only certain claims are invalidated during the 
infringement/validity trial or the entire patent; that is, when patent breadth is narrowed rather than the entire patent 
revoked. This occurs because further entry is not anticipated in our model.  
6 Patent breadth is not the only factor affecting the validity of the patent. A patent may also be invalidated because of 
unallowable amendments during patent examination and because the innovation is not regarded as an invention under 
the patent law (Cornish 1989). By assuming that the innovator has generated a patentable innovation, the latter case is 
excluded. To keep the analysis simple, it is also assumed that the probability of patent invalidation due to unallowable 
amendments is negligible.    10
her innovation then at the second stage of the game she decides on the patent breadth, b , claimed. 
In the third stage of the game, a potential entrant observes the incumbent’s product and the breadth 
of protection granted to it and chooses whether or not to enter the market. If the entrant does not 
enter he earns zero profits while the incumbent operates as a monopolist in the last stage of the 
game and earns monopoly profits  m Π . If the entrant enters, he does so by choosing the quality  e q  
of his product relative to that of the incumbent. This decision determines whether the entrant 
infringes the patent or not, as well as whether the incumbent will invoke a trial in the case the patent 
is infringed.  
  If the entrant chooses a quality greater than or equal to the patent breadth claimed by the 
incumbent (i.e.,  b qe ≥ ), then no infringement occurs, and he and the incumbent compete in prices 
in the last stage of the game and earn duopoly profits 
NI
e Π  and 
NI
p Π , respectively. If the entrant 
locates inside the patent breadth claimed by the incumbent (i.e.,  b qe < ), the patent is infringed and 
the incumbent needs to decide whether to invoke a trial or not. This decision is made in the fourth 
stage of the game. The payoffs for the incumbent and the entrant when the entrant chooses  b qe <  
and the incumbent chooses not to invoke a trial are ( )
IN T
e Π  and ()
IN T
p Π , respectively. If the 
incumbent invokes a trial then the validity of the patent is examined. With probability  ) (b µ , the 
patent is found to be valid (i.e., infringement is found), the entrant is not allowed to market his 
product and the incumbent operates as a monopolist in the last stage of the game. With probability 
) ( 1 b µ − , the patent is found to be invalid, and the entrant and the incumbent compete in prices. The 
payoffs for the incumbent and the entrant when the entrant chooses  e qb <  and the incumbent 
invokes a trial are  ( )
IT
e E Π  and  ()
IT
p E Π , respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the extensive form of the 
game outlined above.   11
  The solution to this game is found by backward induction. The fifth stage of the game in 
which the incumbent and the entrant – when applicable – compete in prices is examined first, 
followed by the fourth stage in which the incumbent makes her trial decision, the third stage in 
which the entrant makes his entry decision, the second stage in which the incumbent makes her 
decision regarding patent breadth and finally the first stage in which the incumbent decides whether 
to patent her innovation or not.   
   12
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* NP
ee π =Π  
Figure 1. The Patenting Game  
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Stage two 
Stage three   13
3.  Analytical Solution of the Game 
3.1  Stage 5 – The Pricing Decisions 
In the fifth stage of the game, two cases must be considered – the case where the entrant has entered 
and the case where the entrant has not entered. Considering the last case first, in the absence of 
entry by the entrant, the incumbent will charge  V pp =  and earn monopoly profits  mp VF Π= − . 
  If entry occurs, the problem facing duopolist i is to choose price  i p  to maximize profit 














= . Recall that the R&D costs, 
p F  and  e F  for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively, are assumed to be sunk at this stage in 
the game. The Nash equilibrium in prices, as well as the resulting outputs and profits, are given by: 





p = , 
3





= π  





p = , 
3





= π  
  Since the entrant has the higher quality product, he charges the higher price. Profits are 
increasing in the distance  e q  between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s location. The greater is the 
difference in quality between the two products, the less intense is competition at the final stage of 
the game and the greater are the profits for both the incumbent and the entrant.
7  
3.2  Stage 4 – The Incumbent’s Trial Decision 
As illustrated in Figure 1, under patenting, the entrant’s location decision (his quality choice  e q ) 
will determine whether the patent will be infringed and whether in the case of infringement a trial 
                                                 
7 This is a well-established result in the product differentiation literature in simultaneous games. When competitors first 
simultaneously choose their locations in the product space and then compete in prices they choose maximum 
differentiation to relax competition in the pricing stage that would curtail their profits (Lane 1980, Motta 1993, Shaked 
and Sutton 1982).   14
will take place. When the entrant infringes the patent, the incumbent/patentee needs to decide 
whether to invoke an infringement trial or not. Given the quality chosen by the entrant, the patentee 
will invoke a trial when the patent is infringed as long as her expected profits when a trial takes 
place,  ()
IT
p E Π , are greater than her profits when a trial does not take place, ()
IN T
p Π , i.e., 
()()
IT IN T
pp E ΠΠ > . 
When the patentee invokes a trial her expected profits are given by:  
(4)  () ( ) ( )
IT T T e
pm p p m p
q
E 1 C 1 ab ab C
9
Πµ Π µ π Π =+ −− = − +−  
Equation (4) demonstrates that with probability µ  infringement will be found (or equivalently that 
the validity of the patent will be upheld) at trial and the entrant will not be allowed in the market 
while the patentee will have a monopoly position and with probability 1 µ −  infringement will not 
be found, the entrant will be allowed to market his product and the patentee and the entrant will 
operate as duopolists.  








Equation (5) shows that when the patentee does not invoke a trial when infringement occurs she 
shares the market with the entrant realizing duopoly profits which depend on the entrant’s choice of 
location in the quality product space.  
  Given the above the patentee will invoke a trial when her patent is infringed if:  
(6)  ()() ( )
T





ΠΠ Π >⇒ < −
−
 
Equation (6) shows that the patentee’s decision on whether to invoke a trial when her patent is 
infringed may be affected by the entrant’s location decision. We denote the quality that makes the   15










(,) e q0 1 ∈  and assume that when the patentee is indifferent she will choose to not invoke a trial. The 
quality  e q  depends among other things on the patent breadth chosen by the incumbent and is 








. Thus, the greater is the 
patent breadth chosen, the smaller is the quality chosen by the entrant that will infringe the patent 
without invoking a trial. Figure 2 below illustrates the relationship between the quality chosen by 
the entrant,  e q , and the patentee’s decision to invoke a trial or not for any patent breadth choice, b .  
  As depicted in Figure 2, as long as the entrant chooses a product quality  e qb ≥  the patent is 
not infringed. When the entrant chooses a product quality  e q  such that  ee qqb < <  (i.e., a quality to 
the right of locus  e q  and below the locus  e bq = ) the patent will be infringed but the patentee will 
not invoke a trial. This outcome is depicted by the dotted area in Figure 2. When the entrant chooses 
a product quality  e q  such that  e qb <  and  ee qq <  (i.e., a quality to the left of locus  e q  and below 
the locus  e bq = ) the patent will be infringed and the patentee will invoke a trial. This outcome is 
depicted by the horizontally hatched area in Figure 2. As the monopoly profits that can be earned by 
the incumbent under no market entry or when the patent is infringed and its validity is upheld 
during trial increase, the locus  e q  shifts upward and the more likely it becomes that a trial will take 
place under infringement (the infringement and trial area becomes larger). The greater are the 
incumbent’s trial costs the less likely it is that she will find it optimal to invoke an infringement trial 
under infringement (as trial costs increase the locus  e q  shifts downward and the infringement and 
trial area becomes smaller).    16
 
  Note that, when  (,] eee qqq 0 1 ≤∀∈ , invoking a trial when the patent is infringed ( e qb < ) is 
always an optimal strategy for the patentee, regardless of the quality chosen by the entrant. This 
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,a n d ( , )
T
mp 0C 0 01 Πα ∀≥ ≥ ∈  (i.e., the 
locus  e q  is above the locus  e qb =  in Figure 2  ( , )and ( , ] e q0 1 b 0 1 ∀ ∈∈ . The case where under 
infringement a trial always occurs regardless of the entrant’s product quality choice,  e q , has been 
examined by Yiannaka and Fulton (2003) and will not be considered here.  
  Also note that, when  (,] eee qqq 0 1 >∀∈ , invoking a trial when the patent is infringed 
( e qb < ) is never an optimal strategy for the patentee, regardless of the quality chosen by the 
entrant. This case occurs when  ()
TT
mp mp 9C 0 C ΠΠ −≤ ⇒≤ ,
T
mp 0C 0 Π ∀ ≥≥  (i.e., the locus  e q  is 
below the locus  e qb =  in Figure 2  ( , )and ( , ] e q0 1 b 0 1 ∀∈ ∈ ); the monopoly profits earned by the 
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market are smaller than the trial costs that she incurs when she invokes an infringement trial. In this 
case, however, it is straightforward to show that, as long as the patenting costs, z, are positive, the 
incumbent will not have an incentive to take a patent. This is so because, given our model 
assumptions of complete information and costless and possible reverse engineering, if the entrant 
knows that irrespective of his quality choice a trial will never take place, he will always find it 
optimal to locate at his most preferred location, 
*
e q , (where he also locates under no patent 
protection) regardless of the patent breadth chosen.
8  
  As mentioned above, we are interested in examining the case under which the entrant by his 
choice of location in the quality product space,  e q , affects the incumbent’s trial and patent breadth 
decisions, i.e., the case where  (,) e q0 1 ∈ . This case occurs when the following conditions are 
satisfied. First, the monopoly profits realized by the incumbent when the entrant does not enter or 












 (i.e., the locuses  e q  and  e bq =  in Figure 2 cross for 
(,) a n d (,] e q0 1 b 0 1 ∈∈ ). Thus, our analysis focuses on the case where a patent breadth  ( , ) b0 1 ∈
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the  e bq =  condition.  
  Second, if we denote the entrant’s most preferred location under no patent protection or 
under patent protection when patent breadth is not binding by 
*





                                                 
8 Note that this is not necessarily true when reverse engineering is possible and costly because the entrant’s optimal 
location choice 
*
e q  will be different under patenting where the information about the incumbent’s product is public 
knowledge and under no patenting where the entrant has to incur a cost to obtain the information.    18




 the entrant will always choose 
*
e q  and the patentee will not 




, regardless of the 
patent breadth chosen she won’t be able to enforce/defend her patent rights, the incumbent will not 




 a patent will not be sought by 
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α
ββ
αΠ α αΠ α Π
>=
+− + − +
. The greater is the entrant’s R&D 
effectiveness (i.e., the smaller isβ ), the more likely it is that patenting will not be profitable for the 
incumbent. In addition, the smaller is the validity parameter, α , and the incumbent’s trial costs, 
T
p C , and the greater are the monopoly profits  m Π , the smaller should be the entrant’s R&D costs to 




 (for a proof see the Appendix).  
 
3.3  Stage 3 – The Entrant’s Location Decision 
As illustrated in Figure 1, two cases must be considered regarding the entrant’s location decision 
depending on whether the incumbent has patented her innovation or not.  
3.3.1  No Patent Protection 
Under no patent protection the entrant can freely locate at any point in the quality product space. 
Note that given our assumption of possible and costless reverse engineering the entrant cannot be 
deterred from entering the market under no patent protection; at the very least, the entrant can locate 
at  ep qq = , share the market with the incumbent and realize zero profits. Let 
*
e q  be the optimal 
quality the entrant chooses under no patent protection, where 
*
e q  solves the following problem: 










β π − = − = Π    19
Optimization of equation (7) yields the optimal quality 
*
e q : 
(8)  
β 9
4 * = e q  
Equation (8) gives the entrant’s most preferred location and indicates that the less costly it is to 
produce the better quality product (i.e., the smaller isβ ), the further away from the incumbent the 
entrant locates.  
3.3.2  Patent Protection 
Under patent protection and anticipating the incumbent’s behavior concerning trial given  e q , the 
entrant must choose one of four options – Not Enter, Enter and Not Infringe the Patent, Enter, 
Infringe the Patent and Induce a Trial or Enter, Infringe the Patent and Not Induce a Trial. For any 
given patent breadth, b , the entrant will choose the option that generates the greatest profit. 
  The outcome of the Not Enter option is straightforward – the entrant earns zero profits. The 
outcomes of the other three options depend on a number of factors, including patent breadth, R&D 
costs and trial costs. The benefits and costs associated with the Enter and Not Infringe option are 
examined below, followed by an examination of the benefits and costs associated with the Enter and 
Infringe option. The examination of the Enter and Infringe option consists of the examination of the 
Enter, Infringe and Not Induce a Trial and the Enter Infringe and Induce a Trial options. Once the 
net benefits of each option are formulated, the most desirable option for the entrant is determined 
for any given patent breadth.  
3.3.2.1  Entry with No Infringement ( b qe ≥ ) 
For the entrant to enter without infringing the patent, the entrant must choose a quality location that 
is greater than or equal to the patent breadth – i.e.,  b qe ≥ . Given that 
*
e q  is the entrant’s most 
preferred location, as long as  b qe ≥
* , the patent breadth does not affect the location chosen by the   20
entrant (patent breadth is not binding), since the entrant can choose his optimal quality without fear 
of infringement. Thus, patent breadth will only be binding if  b qe <
* . Note that, when the entrant’s 
R&D cost parameter takes its minimum value (
4
9
β = ) the entrant never infringes the patent as 
* 1 e q = . Since an increase in quality beyond 
*
e q  results in a reduction in profits, the entrant’s profit is 
decreasing in  e q  for all 
*
e e q q > . As a result, the entrant, when faced with a binding patent breadth, 
will always choose a quality equal to the patent breadth chosen by the incumbent (i.e.,  b qe = ). 
  Thus, a profit-maximizing entrant that wishes to not infringe the patent will choose his entry 
location 
NI
e q  as follows: 
 (9)   



















while the profits earned by the entrant are: 
(10)  


























3.3.2.2  Entry with Infringement ( b qe < ) 
As discussed earlier the analysis focuses on the case where the entrant by his choice of location in 





when the entrant decides to infringe the patent he must determine whether to induce the incumbent 
to invoke a trial or not. The entrant’s profits under infringement and trial are determined below 
followed by his profits when he infringes and does not induce the patentee to invoke a trial.   
The Entrant’s Profits under Infringement and Trial    21
Recall that during an infringement trial there is a probability  1b µ α = −  that the validity of the 
patent will be upheld (or equivalently that infringement will be found) and a probability 1b µ α − =  
that the patent will be revoked. If the patent is found to be valid during trial, the entrant cannot enter 
and the patentee has a monopoly position in the market. If the patent is found to be invalid, the 
entrant is allowed to market his product and the patentee and the entrant operate as duopolists. With 
this background, the quality chosen by the entrant is determined by solving: 
(11)   () max ( )
e
2
T IT T ee
ee e e e q
4q q
E1F C b C
92
Πµ π α β =−⋅−− = − −  
The optimal quality chosen is given by: 








=   






α β <⇒ <  ∀ (0,1) α ∈  and  0
4
9
ββ >> . Equation (12) shows that when the entrant 
infringes the patent he finds it optimal to locate at a distance proportional to the breadth of the 
patent. Because there is uncertainty with respect to whether the entrant will be able to continue in 
the market, he ‘underlocates’; to reduce the R&D costs, which are incurred with certainty, the 
entrant locates closer to the patentee than he would have done had infringement not been a 
possibility.  
The expected profits for the entrant are given by equation (13): 










When patent breadth is negligible (i.e., b  approaches zero), the expected profits from infringement 
approach  e C − , since the probability of the patent being found valid approaches one. As patent   22
breadth increases, expected profits from infringement also increase, a reflection of the rising 
probability that the patent will be found invalid. 
The Entrant’s Profits under Infringement and No Trial  
When the choice of the entrant’s most preferred quality 
*
e q  results in infringement and trial and the 
entrant wishes to infringe but not induce a trial, he maximizes his profits by choosing the lowest  e q  
associated with ensuring that the patentee does not invoke a trial. Thus, to maximize his profits 
under the infringement and no trial outcome the entrant will choose the quality ()
IN T
ee qq =  (recall 
that when the patentee is indifferent between invoking and not invoking a trial she will choose to 
not invoke a trial). Given the above, the entrant’s profits under infringement and no trial are given 
by equation (14): 
(14)  ( ) () ()
TT 2
pp IN T 2 ee
ee e m m
CC 4q q 81
F4
92 1 b 2 1 b
β
Ππ β Π Π
αα
=−= − = − − −
−−
 
The entrant’s profits under infringement and no trial ()
IN T
e Π  are non decreasing in b ,  [,) bb b ∀∈
G
, 











 (for a proof see Appendix). Thus, the greater is patent breadth, 
b , the smaller is  e q  and thus the closer to 
*
e q  the entrant can locate without inducing the patentee to 
invoke a trial.  





as well as the entrant’s profits under no infringement, infringement and trial and infringement and 























,  (,] bb 1 ∈
G
, the entrant will 
always find it optimal to enter the market and locate at his most preferred location, 
*
e q , without   23
invoking a trial; patent breadth is not binding for  ( , ] 0 b0 b ∈  and for  [,] bb 1 ∈  the incumbent always 
finds it optimal to not invoke a trial under infringement. When the patent breadth chosen is such 
that  (,) 0 bb b ∈
G
, the entrant cannot locate at his most preferred location, 
*
e q  without infringing the 
patent while the patentee will always find it profitable to invoke a trial when the patent is infringed 
(i.e.,  e qb < ). In this case, the entrant will have to decide whether to enter and if entry occurs 
whether to infringe or not the patent knowing that if he infringes a trial will always take place. 
Finally, when the patent breadth chosen is such that  [,) bb b ∈
G
, the entrant cannot locate at his most 
preferred location, 
*
e q  without infringing the patent but he can, by his choice of location on the 
quality product space,  e q , affect whether the patentee will invoke a trial or not when the patent is 
infringed.  
For the profit curves depicted in Figure 3, if the patentee chooses patent breadth  1 b  the 
entrant will find it optimal to choose the product quality, ( )
IT
e q , that infringes the patent and 
induces the patentee to invoke a trial while if the patentee chooses patent breadth  2 b  the entrant will 
find it optimal to choose the product quality ( )
IN T
e q , that infringes the patent and induces the 
patentee to not invoke a trial. Thus, under this scenario the entrant has to decide whether to enter 
and if entry occurs whether to induce the patentee to invoke a trial or not. Note that when  [,) bb b ∈
G
 
the entrant will never choose to not infringe the patent since the non infringement strategy is always 
dominated by the infringement and no trial strategy (i.e., the entrant’s profits under no infringement 
and under infringement and no trial are equal at b
G
,  () ( ) ()
NI I NT




e Π  and  ( )
IN T
e E Π  
are decreasing and increasing in b , respectively, for any  ( , ] bb 1 ∈
G
).  
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The Entry/Infringement Decision 
To determine the entrant’s optimal strategy we must first determine whether there exists a patent 
breadth  ˆ (,) o bb b ∈
G
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      the Entrant’s profits under No Infringement, Infringement and Trial and     
      Infringement and No Trial.  
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ˆˆ ˆ () ( )() ( ) ()
NI I T I NT
ee e b0E b0E b0 ΠΠ Π ≤∧ ≤∧ ≤. Define 
T
I b  as the patent breadth that makes the 
entrant indifferent between entering the market, infringing the patent and inducing a trial and not 
entering the market. Thus, 
T
I b  solves:  ( ) ( )
IT T
eI E b0 Π =  where  ( , ]
T
I0 bb 1 ∈ .
9 Also, define 
NT
I b  as the 
patent breadth that makes the entrant indifferent between entering the market, infringing the patent 
and not inducing a trial and not entering the market. Thus, 
NT
I b  solves:  ( ) ( )
IN T N T
eI Eb 0 Π =  where 
(, ]
NT
I0 bb 1 ∈ . Finally, define  NI b  as the patent breadth that makes the entrant indifferent between 
entering the market without infringing the patent and not entering the market – i.e.,  NI b  satisfies 
()
NI


































 or  0 β β ≥  whichever is greater. Given the above, any  ( , ] 0 bb 1 ∈  such that 
T
I bb ≤  makes entry 
under infringement and trial unprofitable for the entrant, any  ( , ] 0 bb 1 ∈  such that 
NT
I bb ≤  makes 
entry under infringement and no trial unprofitable for the entrant, while any  ( , ] 0 bb 1 ∈  such that 
NI bb ≥  makes entry under no infringement unprofitable for the entrant.  
Scenario A: Entry Deterrence  
The entrant will not find it profitable to enter the market if there exists a  ˆ (, ] 0 bb 1 ∈  such that 
ˆ for
TT N T
NI I I I bb b b b ≤≤ <  or  ˆ for
NT T NT
NI I I I bb b b b ≤≤ >  and  NI bb ≥
G
. The entry deterrence outcome is 
illustrated in Figure 4. The larger is the R&D cost parameter β , the easier it is to deter entry, 
ceteris paribus, because as β  increases  NI b  becomes smaller, 
T
I b  becomes larger while b
G
 is 
                                                 
9 The assumption is made that the entrant will not enter when he is indifferent between entering and infringing the 
patent and not entering.    26
unaffected, making it more likely that the entry deterrence condition  ˆ T
NI I bb b ≤ ≤  and  NI bb ≥
G
 will 
be satisfied.  
 
Scenario B: Entry Cannot be Deterred  
There are a number of different cases where entry cannot be deterred leading to different optimal 
strategies for both the incumbent and the entrant. Generally, entry cannot be deterred when either a 
patent breadth  NI b  that makes the entrant indifferent between entering without infringing and not 
entering does not exist, when it exists and  NI bb <
G
 and/or a patent breadth, b  , exists that makes the 
entrant indifferent between infringing the patent and inducing a trial and not infringing the patent, 
while still generating positive profits for the entrant – i.e., b  solves  () ( )() )
NI I T
ee bE b 0 ΠΠ =>   
where  (, ] 0 bb 1 ∈  . The expression for b  is derived in the Appendix. To examine the different cases 
that can emerge when entry cannot be deterred, let b   be the patent breadth that makes the entrant 
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Figure 4. The Entrant’s Profits under No Infringement, Infringement and Trial and 
      Infringement and No Trial when Entry can be Deterred.   27
inducing a trial, while still generating positive profits for the entrant – i.e., b    solves 
() ( ) () ( ) )
IT IN T
ee bE b 0 ΠΠ =>    where  (, ] 0 bb 1 ∈   . The expression for b   is derived in the Appendix. 
As will become evident in the cases below, the optimal strategy for the entrant when entry cannot 
be deterred (scenario B) depends on the relationship between b
G
,  NI b  and b  as well as on the 
existence of b . Cases I and II examine the entrant’s profits when b  exists which implies that at 
b1 =   the entrant’s profits under infringement and no trial will always be greater than his profits 
under infringement and trial, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
IN T IT
ee b1 b1 ΠΠ = >= . Cases III and IV examine the entrant’s 
profits when b  does not exist, which implies that at b1 =   the entrant’s profits under infringement 
and no trial can be greater, equal to or smaller than his profits under infringement and trial. Cases 
III and IV consider the situation where () ( ) () ( )
IN T IT
ee b1 b1 ΠΠ = <= . When b  does not exist and 
() ( ) () ( )
IN T IT
ee b1 b1 ΠΠ =≥ = cases III and IV are equivalent to cases I and II, respectively.  
  Case I: ∃b ∧b   ∧ bb ≤
G   
Under this case, the entrant’s optimal strategy is to either not infringe the patent for relatively low 
patent breadth values ( (,) 0 bb b ∈
G
) or to infringe the patent and not induce a trial for relatively high 
patent breadth values ( [ , ) bb 1 ∈
G
); the infringement and trial strategy is a dominated strategy for all 
patent breadth values. This case is most likely to emerge when the entrant’s trial costs, 
T
e C ,  are 
relatively high, making infringement and trial less attractive to the entrant, and the incumbent’s 
monopoly profits,  m Π , and trial costs, 
T
p C  are relatively, low and high, respectively (making  e q  
smaller for any patent breadth and thus the infringe and no trial strategy attractive to the entrant). 
Case I is depicted in panel (i) in Figure 5.  
  Case II: ∃b ∧b   ∧ bb >
G     28
Under this case, the entrant’s optimal strategy is to not infringe the patent for relatively low patent 
breadth values ( (,) 0 bb b ∈  ), infringe the patent and induce a trial for intermediate patent breadth 
values ( [,) bb b ∈  ) and infringe the patent and not induce a trial for relatively large patent breadth 
values ( [, ) bb b ∈   ). This case is most likely to emerge when the entrant’s trial costs, 
T
e C , and the 
validity parameter, α , are relatively low, and the R&D cost parameter, β , is relatively high, 
(making infringement with trial attractive to the entrant) and when the incumbent’s monopoly 
profits,  m Π , and trial costs, 
T
p C , are relatively high and low, respectively (making infringement and 
no trial attractive only for large values of patent breadth). Case II is depicted in panel (ii) in Figure 
5.  
  Case III: ∃b , ∃b  ∧ bb ≤
G   
Under this case, the entrant will find it optimal to not infringe the patent for relatively low patent 
breadth values ( (,] 0 bb b ∈
G
), he will infringe the patent and not induce a trial for intermediate patent 
breadth values,  (,] bb b ∈
G    and he will infringe the patent and induce a trial for relatively high patent 
breadth values  ( , ] bb 1 ∈   . This case is most likely to emerge when the entrant’s trial costs, 
T
e C , R&D 
cost parameter, β ,  and the validity parameter, α , are relatively high (making infringement and 
trial attractive only for high patent breadth values) and the incumbent’s monopoly profits  m Π , and 
trial costs, 
T
p C , are low and high, respectively (making infringement and no trial attractive even for 
relatively low patent breadth values). Case III is depicted in panel (iii) in Figure 5.  
  Case IV: ∃b , ∃b  ∧ bb >
G   
Under this case, the entrant will find it optimal to not infringe the patent for relatively low patent 
breadth values ( (,] 0 bb b ∈  ) and infringe the patent inducing the incumbent to invoke a trial for   29
relatively large patent breadth values ( ( , ] bb 1 ∈  ); the infringe-and-not-induce-a-trial strategy is 
dominated by the other two strategies for all patent breadth values. This case is most likely to occur 
when the entrant’s trial costs, 
T
e C ,  and R&D cost parameter, β , are relatively low and high, 
respectively, the validity parameter, α , is high (making infringement and trial attractive) and the 
incumbent’s monopoly profits  m Π , and trial costs, 
T
p C , are relatively high and low, respectively 
(making infringement and no trial less attractive). Case IV is depicted in panel (iv) in Figure 5.  
   30
 
3.3  Stage 2 – The Patent Breadth Decision 
In stage 2 of the game, the incumbent chooses the patent breadth b  that maximizes profits, given 
her knowledge of the entrant’s behavior in the third stage of the game. Since the entrant’s behavior 
depends on the values of  m Π , 
T
p C , 
T
e C , α  and β , the patent breadth chosen by the incumbent also 
Figure 5. The Entrant’s Profits under No Infringement, under Infringement and Trial 
      and under Infringement and No Trial when Entry cannot be Deterred and  b ∃  
      – panels (a) and (b) and when  b ∃  – panels (c) and (d).  
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depends on these parameters. Specifically, the following situations are possible, each one 
corresponding to one of the scenarios and cases outlined above.  
Scenario A: Choose Patent Breadth to Deter Entry 
If there exists a patent breadth  ˆ (, ] 0 bb 1 ∈  such that  ˆ for
TT N T
NI I I I bb b b b ≤≤ <  or 
ˆ for
NT T NT
NI I I I bb b b b ≤≤ >  and  NI bb ≥
G
 then the incumbent will choose this patent breadth and deter 
entry. By deterring entry, the incumbent earns monopoly profits,  m Π . Since these profits are higher 
than what can be earned under a duopoly, the incumbent always finds it optimal to deter entry.  
Scenario B: Entry Cannot be Deterred 
When entry cannot be deterred the incumbent will never find it optimal to choose patent breadth 
values such that  ( , ] 0 b0 b ∈  and  [,] bb 1 ∈  as for these patent breadth values the patenting strategy is 
always dominated by the no patenting strategy. As illustrated in Figure 3, in this case the entrant 
will find it optimal to locate at his most preferred location, 
*
e q  (the location chosen under no patent 
protection) as when  ( , ] 0 b0 b ∈  patent breadth is not binding while when  [,] bb 1 ∈  the incumbent’s 
optimal strategy when the patent is infringed is to not invoke a trial. Given the above, as long as 
patenting costs are positive ( 0 z > ), the incumbent maximizes her profits when she does not patent 
the innovation. Thus, the relevant patent breadth values that can be chosen by the incumbent when 
entry cannot be deterred are patent breadth values such that  (,) 0 bb b ∈ .  
  Case I: ∃b ∧b   ∧ bb ≤
G   
Under this case, it is never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent and induce the incumbent to 
invoke a trial. The incumbent has to decide whether to choose a patent breadth  (,) 0 bb b ∈
G
 that will 
induce the entrant not to infringe the patent or to choose a patent breadth  [,) bb b ∈
G
 that will induce 
the entrant to infringe the patent without inducing a trial. Note that the entrant is indifferent between   32
not infringing the patent and infringing the patent without inducing a trial when bb =
G
, i.e., 
() ( ) ()
NI I NT
ee bb ΠΠ =
GG
. In both cases, the incumbent’s profits are increasing in the entrant’s quality 
choice  e q , i.e.,  
* ()




ΠΠ π == = , thus, the incumbent maximizes her profits by forcing the 
entrant to locate the furthest away in the quality product space. Since under no infringement the 
entrant will choose 
NI
e qb =  while under infringement and no trial he will choose ()
IN T
ee qq =  and 
for e qbb b ==
G
 while  (,] e qb bb 1 <∀∈
G
 the incumbent’s profit maximizing strategy under Case I is 
to choose the patent breadth bb =
G
.  
  Case II: ∃b ∧b   ∧ bb >
G   
Under this case, the incumbent has to decide whether to choose a patent breadth  (,] 0 bb b ∈   and 
induce the entrant to not infringe the patent, choose a patent breadth  (,) bb b ∈   and induce the 
entrant to infringe the patent and induce a trial or choose a patent breadth  [, ) bb b ∈    and induce the 
entrant to infringe the patent and not induce a trial. The optimal strategy for the incumbent depends 
on her profits under no infringement, 
NI
p Π , infringement and trial, ()
IT
p Π  and infringement and no 
trial, ()
IN T
p Π . It is straightforward to show that the infringement and no trial strategy is always 
dominated by the non infringement strategy. The reasoning is as follows. If the incumbent were to 
choose to induce non infringement the optimal strategy would be to choose the patent breadth b  
since this is the patent breadth that forces the entrant to locate the furthest away possible in the 
quality space without infringing the patent. If the incumbent were to choose to induce infringement 
and no trial then the optimal strategy would be to choose patent breadth b   since this is the patent 
breadth that induces the entrant to locate the furthest away possible under infringement and no trial 
(for any bb >    the entrant locates closer to the incumbent – note that in panel (ii) in Figure 5 the   33
entrant’s profits under infringement and no trial are increasing in patent breadth). Moreover, as it 
can be seen in panel (ii) in Figure 5, the entrant’s profits at b   are greater than his profits at b  which 
implies that the quality chosen by the entrant when b   is chosen by the incumbent,  e qb =  is greater 












Since the incumbent’s profits under non infringement and under infringement and no trial are both 
increasing in the quality chosen by the entrant,  e q , the incumbent is better off choosing b  rather 
than b  , i.e.,  ( ) ( ) ( )
NI I NT
pp bb ΠΠ >   . Given the above, in this case the incumbent’s choice is between 
inducing non infringement by claiming b  and inducing infringement and trial by claiming either 
or where be be e 0 +− →   .  
  The choice that maximizes the incumbent’s profits depends in a complex way on the relative 
values of the parameters,  m Π , 
T
p C , 
T
e C , α  and β . In general, the greater are the incumbent’s 
monopoly profits, the greater is the incumbent’s incentive to induce infringement since the only 
opportunity the incumbent has to realize monopoly profits (when entry cannot be deterred) is when 
her patent is infringed and its validity is upheld during the infringement trial. The larger are the 
incumbent’s monopoly profits and the validity parameter and the smaller are the entrant’s R&D 
costs the more likely it is that the incumbent will find it optimal to induce non infringement. It is 
important to note that, in this case, the incumbent never finds it optimal to claim the maximum 
breadth of patent protection or choose a patent breadth that allows the entrant to infringe the patent 
without facing an infringement trial.  
  Case III: ∃b , ∃b  ∧ bb ≤
G     34
In this case, the incumbent has to decide whether to choose a patent breadth  (,] 0 bb b ∈
G
 and induce 
the entrant to not infringe the patent, choose a patent breadth  (,] bb b ∈
G    and induce the entrant to 
infringe the patent and not induce a trial or choose a patent breadth  ( , ] bb 1 ∈    and induce the entrant 
to infringe the patent and induce a trial. When deciding between inducing non infringement and 
infringement and no trial the incumbent’s optimal strategy is to choose the patent breadth b
G
 as 
demonstrated in Case I. Thus, under Case III the incumbent will either choose the patent breadth b
G
 
which makes her indifferent between inducing non infringement and inducing infringement and no 
trial or she will choose to induce infringement by choosing either be +    or b1 = . The choice that 
maximizes the incumbent’s profits depends in a complex way on the relative values of the 
parameters,  m Π , 
T
p C , 
T
e C , α  and β ; their effect on the incumbent’s optimal decision is as 
described in Case II.   
  Case IV: ∃b , ∃b  ∧ bb >
G   
Under this case, it is never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent without inducing a trial. The 
incumbent has to decide whether to choose a patent breadth  (,] 0 bb b ∈   and induce the entrant to not 
infringe the patent or to choose a patent breadth  ( , ] bb 1 ∈   and induce the entrant to infringe the 
patent and induce a trial. This case has been examined by Yiannaka and Fulton (2003) who find that 
the incumbent will induce non infringement by claiming bb =   or induce infringement and trial by 
claiming either  where bbe e 0 =+ →   or b1 = .  The optimal strategy for the incumbent depends in 
a complex way on the values of the parameters  m Π , 
T
p C , 
T
e C , α  and β .   
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3.4  Stage 1 – The Patenting Decision 
In stage 1 of the game the incumbent decides whether to patent her innovation or not given her 
knowledge of the entrant’s response to her patent breadth and trial decisions. The incumbent will 
choose to patent her innovation when the profits earned under patenting are greater than the profits 
earned under no patent protection. As described in the preceding sections under no patent protection 
entry cannot be deterred and the entrant will enter the market choosing his most preferred quality 
*







Π= =  and, as 
expected, are increasing in the entrant’s R&D effectiveness; the lower are the entrant’s R&D costs, 
the further away he locates from the incumbent and the less intense is price competition at the last 
stage of the game. The profits realized by the incumbent under patent protection depend on whether 
she can deter entry (Scenario A) or not (Scenario B) and when entry cannot be deterred whether the 
entrant will infringe the patent or not and induce her to invoke a trial or not (Cases I, II, III and IV).  




, the patenting strategy is always 
dominated by the no patenting strategy. In this case, under patenting the entrant always chooses 
*
e q  
and the patentee does not invoke a trial. As long as patenting costs are positive the incumbent 







z Π >Π = − 0 z ∀> . Thus, 
when under patenting the incumbent can never enforce her patent rights when the patent is infringed 
she always chooses to not patent. When, however, the entrant’s location choice affects whether the 




) the optimal 
strategy for the incumbent depends on the values of  the parameters  m Π , 
T
p C , 
T
e C , α  and β .    36
  Under patent protection when entry can be deterred (Scenario A), the incumbent’s profits 
are given by 
P
pm z Π= Π−. The decision to patent or not in this case depends on the monopoly 
profits that can be captured by the incumbent, the magnitude of the patenting costs and the entrant’s 







≤ Π− Π≥ Π , patenting is 
more profitable than no patenting for the incumbent. The greater are the monopoly profits and the 
entrant’s R&D costs (the greater is β), the more likely it is that patenting will result in greater 
profits than no patenting for the incumbent. 
  When entry cannot be deterred under patent protection (Scenario B) and under Case I, the 
incumbent’s optimal patent breadth strategy is to choose patent breadth bb =
G
. The incumbent is 
indifferent in this case between inducing the entrant to not infringe the patent and allowing 
infringement without invoking a trial as  ( ) ( ) ( )
NI I NT
pp bb Π= Π
G G
. Thus, the incumbent’s profits under 
patenting under Case I are given by 
22 19 13 6 1 8 8 1 ()
91 8
T
mp m m P e
p
aa C a a qb
zz
a
+Π −+ − Π + Π =
Π= −= −
G
. As long as patenting costs are 
such that 
22 19 13 6 1 8 8 1 4
18 81
T
mp m m aa C a a
z
a β
+Π −+ − Π + Π
≤−  patenting will be more profitable 
than no patenting for the incumbent. The greater are the monopoly profits and the entrant’s R&D 
costs and the smaller is the validity parameter and the incumbent’s trial costs the more likely it is 
that patenting will be more profitable than no patenting for the incumbent under Case I. Thus, under 
certain parameter values, the incumbent may find it optimal to patent her innovation even when she 
does not find it optimal to defend her patent under patent infringement.   
  When entry cannot be deterred under patent protection and under Cases II and IV it is never 
optimal for the incumbent to allow infringement without invoking a trial. Under these cases the   37
incumbent will either induce the entrant to not infringe the patent by claiming patent breadth bb =   
or to infringe the patent by claiming bbe = +   or bbe = −    (Case II),  1 b =  (Case IV). When the 
incumbent’s optimal patent breadth strategy is to choose bb =   and induce non infringement her 
profits under patent protection are given by 
22
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will be more profitable than no patenting for the incumbent. Under this case, the smaller is the 
validity parameter, α, and the entrant’s R&D costs, β, and the greater are the entrant’s trial costs the 
more likely it is that patenting will be more profitable than no patenting.  
  When the incumbent’s optimal strategy under patenting is to induce infringement and trial 
by claiming bbe =+   then her profits under patent protection are given by 
22 4( )
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patenting will be more profitable than no patenting for the incumbent. When the optimal strategy 
for the incumbent is to induce infringement and trial by claiming  1 b =  then her profits under patent 









Π= Π −= − Π+ − − and as long as patenting costs 










≤−Π + −  patenting will be more profitable than no patenting for 
the incumbent. Under this case, the greater are the monopoly profits and the smaller are the   38
incumbent’s trial costs the more likely it is that patenting will be more profitable than no patenting 
for the incumbent.  
  Finally, when entry cannot be deterred under patent protection and under Case III the 
incumbent’s optimal strategy is to either claim patent breadth bb =
G
 and induce non infringement or 
infringement and no trial or to claim  1 b =  and induce infringement and trial. The patenting costs 
that would make patenting more profitable than no patenting for the incumbent under these cases 
have been examined in the Cases I, II and IV.   
4.  Concluding Remarks 
A simple game theoretic model was developed to examine how an innovator’s decision to seek 
patent protection and her optimal patent breadth decision affect and are affected by her ability to 
enforce her patent rights. The innovator in our model seeks patent protection for a product 
innovation under potential entry by a firm producing a better quality product. The innovator must 
decide whether to patent her innovation or not and under patenting how broad should be the patent 
protection claimed. The entrant observes the patent breadth granted to the innovator’s product under 
patenting and decides whether to enter and if entry occurs where to locate in the quality product 
space. Finally, the innovator observes the entrant’s quality choice and in the case of infringement 
decides on whether to invoke a trial or not. A key feature of the model is that the entrant can, by his 
choice of product quality, affect the innovator’s trial decision when the patent is infringed.  
  Analytical results show when the innovator can use patent breadth to deter entry she will 
find it profitable to patent her innovation when her monopoly profits (earned under no entry or 
when the validity of the patent is upheld during an infringement trial) are large, patenting costs are 
small and the entrant’s trial and R&D costs are large. Entry deterrence is achieved by claiming a 
patent breadth that is less than the maximum breadth possible while the greater are the entrant’s   39
R&D and trial costs, the larger are the incumbent’s monopoly profits and the smaller is the validity 
parameter and the incumbent’s trial costs, the greater is the likelihood that entry can be deterred.  
  When entry cannot be deterred, the incumbent may find it optimal to patent her innovation 
even when she chooses to not defend her patent under infringement. Under this case the incumbent 
is able through patent protection to force the entrant to locate further away in the quality product 
space than he would have located under no patent protection. This case arises when patenting costs 
are low, the entrant’s R&D costs are relatively large, the validity parameter is small and monopoly 
profits are relatively large.  
The optimal patent breadth when entry cannot be deterred is in most cases smaller than the 
maximum breadth possible. This is so because as patent breadth increases, the closer the entrant can 
locate to his most preferred location without inducing a trial and the smaller are the profits earned 
by the incumbent. In general, the entrant’s ability to affect the innovator’s trial decision by his 
choice of product quality results in a smaller patent breadth claimed by the incumbent.    
  The above results hold under our model assumptions of complete and perfect information, 
single entry, a deterministic R&D process and possible and costless reverse engineering of the 
innovator’s product. Relaxing the above assumptions is the focus of future research.    40
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Appendix 
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The root  2 b  is accepted as a possible solution as  ( , ) 2 b0 1 ∈  for 
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Figure A.1 depicts the combinations of β  and  m Π  values for given 
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 is satisfied. The shaded area in Figure A.1 includes all combinations of β  and  m Π  values 






























  The Entrant’s Profits under Infringement and No Trial 
Since the entrant’s profits are maximized at 
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entrant maximizes his profits under infringement and no trial by choosing  e q  (i.e., the quality that is closest 
to 
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 as  [,) bb b ∈
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increases the entrant’s profits under infringement and no trial also increase.    
  The Existence of  (, ) 0 bb 1 ∈   
If a patent breadth b
~  that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the patent, 
while still generating positive profits for the entrant, exists it should satisfy the conditions  0 b( b , 1 ] ∈   and 
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The condition b1 ≤   is satisfied for certain combinations of β , α  and 
T
e C . To determine the combinations 
of β , α  and 
T
e C  values which satisfy the condition b1 ≤  , the pairs of β , α and 
T
e C  values that satisfy the 
above constraint as an equality ( ˜  b =1) are determined first. The solution of  ˜  b =1 with respect to 
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= . The area to the right of the locus b1 =   represents all combinations of β  and 
T
e C  
values, for a given α value, for which b1 <  . If b   exists it must also satisfy the conditions 
NI
e (b) 0 Π >   and 
IT
e E() ( b ) ) 0 Π >  . Thus, b   must violate the entry deterrence condition – b   must take values in the interval 
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T
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β << (i.e., when  NI b  
does not exist). To determine the combination of β , α and 
T
e C  values for which 
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e C  values, for a given α value, below the locus 
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I bb b <<   while all combinations of β  and 
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β =  are such that 
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